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A LESSON FROM THE ANCIENTS: ON THE USE OF DEFINITION
IN CLASSICAL THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION
Van Rees has put our understanding of the role of dissociation in
argumentation on a ﬁrmer foundation than it has ever been. By
remarkably mastering the analytical categories of pragma-dialectics,
the author illuminates the nature of dissociation in connection with
the speciﬁc tasks underlined in the diﬀerent stages of a critical discus-
sion, with a focus on the dialectical and rhetorical gains of the process
in the interplay between the protagonist and the antagonist.
In the following lines I intend to shed light on the historical dimen-
sion of dissociation by examining Classical Greek and Roman theory
of argumentation. This dimension, I believe, has been only partially
approached by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969). Although the
concept of dissociation strictu sensu has not been codiﬁed by the an-
cients, in some traditional handbooks of argumentation technique we
ﬁnd important ancestral echoes that can further illuminate its treat-
ment. While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive account of
the topic in this paper, I shall limit myself to an analysis of a few pas-
sages found in Aristotle’s and Cicero’s works on argument schemes
(the topoi). These works introduce various strategies of argumentation
some of which put into place aspects of dissociation thoroughly exam-
ined by van Rees.
In ancient philosophy, we ﬁnd interesting uses of dissociation for
analytical purposes. As Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969) notes, in
original thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle we often read instances of
dissociation made, for example, to distinguish aspects of phenomena
to be taken as contraries (for example, doxa versus episteme in the
concept of knowledge) or to subdivide phenomena in their composing
parts (for example, a genus in its species). In these contexts, distinc-
tions and subdivisions enable one to systematise the analysis of the
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phenomena involved, while enhancing the argumentative appeal of the
analysis itself.
As previously mentioned, it is in ancient theory of argumentation
where we ﬁnd devises which play on some core aspects of dissociation.
As van Rees remarks in more than one section of her paper, dissocia-
tion enhances the dialectical reasonableness of an argumentation in
virtue of its elucidating nature. Moreover, it acts in ways that favour
the rhetorical gain, since it generally assists the speaker in taking posi-
tions that serve him best. In Aristotle’s Topics, we ﬁnd strategies based
on the use of deﬁnition that aim at similar performances.
More speciﬁcally, the method of argumentation explained in the
Topics is based on the treatment of propositions in terms of their sub-
ject-predicate structure (Brunschwig 1967; Primavesi 1996; Rubinelli
2003, 2006): speakers are guided on how to argue by focusing on the
belonging of the predicate contained in the proposition to be estab-
lished or refuted to the subject of the proposition itself. In the follow-
ing passage, one of the topoi suggests speakers to make a deﬁnition
either of the subject or predicate of the proposition acting as stand-
point, or of both, so as to reﬁne their meanings in a way that best
accommodates the argumentative intention of the speaker:
Another topos is to make deﬁnition both of the accident and of that to which it belongs
(ἄλλoς τò λóγoυς πoιειˆν τoυˆ συμβεβηκóτoς καὶ ᾡˆ συμβέβηκεν), either of both sepa-
rately or one of them, and then see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the
deﬁnitions. For example… to see whether the good man is envious, you must ask, who
is ‘envious’ and what is ‘envy’? For if ‘envy’ is pain at the apparent prosperity of an
honest man (ὁ φθὁνoς ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινoμένῃ εὐπραγίᾳ τωˆν ἐπιεικωˆν τινóς),
clearly the good man is not envious; for then he would be a bad man (Topics 109b 30–
35)1
The process of deﬁnition is here used to interpret the meaning of a
term so as to highlight those central semantic characteristics that sup-
port its correct attribution in a declarative predication. In the example
above, the proposed deﬁnition of ‘envious’, if granted by the interlocu-
tor, leads the antagonist refute the standpoint of the protagonist that a
good man can be envious.
In the Aristotelian horizon, a deﬁnition is intended to be a formula
expressing the essence of something by means of the genus and the dif-
ferentia of it (Topics 101b 38, see especially De Pater 1965), like the
formula ‘virtue of the reasoning faculty’ (τoυˆ λoγιστικoυˆ ἀρετὴ) is the
definition of ‘wisdom’ (ἡ φρóνησις) (Topics 101b 38 and 145a 30–31).
In books E and Z of the Topics, Aristotle attributes an argumentative
role to this sort of deﬁnition, when considering it as one of the four
predicables, i.e. the relations in which a predicate may stand to its
subject (Rubinelli 2006). There he suggests that the establishment or
refutation of a predicate put forward as deﬁnition of a subject plays
on the individuation of the genus and the diﬀerentia of the subject
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itself. Yet, as Socrates teaches us, constructing deﬁnitions by means of
genera and diﬀerentiae is a hard task: while it is generally not diﬃcult
to individuate the genus of a thing, indicating the characteristic that
makes it essentially unique undoubetly arises some diﬃculties. Here, it
must be underlined that the persuasiveness of an argument from deﬁ-
nition does not depend on whether the deﬁnition utilized meets the
standards of proper deﬁning. What matters, however, is that the deﬁ-
nition given is accepted by the interlocutor. Aristotle seems to be
aware of this factor. Thus, in giving examples for the afore mentioned
topos he seems to suggest using as deﬁnition endoxical formulas that,
being potentially shared by the majority of people or at least by the
experts in the ﬁeld (Topics A, I), have the adequate topical potential
for being granted by the antagonist. This case becomes more clear
when considering that another Aristotelian topos advise on sharpening
the meaning of a term, so as to accommodate the move wanted by the
speaker in the expected dimension, by appealing either to vulgar or ex-
pert denominations. The passage in question reads:
Furthermore, you must define what kinds of things should be called as the majority call
them, and what should not (ἔτι διoρίζεσθαι πo ιˆα δειˆ καλειˆν ὡς oἱ πoλλoὶ καὶ πo ιˆα
oὔ); for this is useful both for constructive and destructive purposes. For instance, you
ought to lay it down that things ought to be described in the language used by the major-
ity, but when it is asked what things are of certain kinds and what are not, you must no
longer pay attention to the majority. For example, you must say, as do the majority, that
‘healthy’ is that which is productive of health (ὑγιεινòν ῥητέoν τò πoιητικòν ὑγιείας);
but when it is asked whether the subject under discussion is productive of health or
not, you must no longer use the language of the majority, but that of the doctor (ὡς ὁ
ἰατρóς). (Topics 110a 14–15).
Within a similar perspective, another way of individuating that
meaning of a term that best suits the interest of the speaker is to trace
the term back to its etymology. In the following passage the strategy is
applied by refuting the established meaning of the term ‘stout-souled’:
Another method of attack is to refer back a term to its original meaning (μεταφέρoντα
τoὔνoμα κατὰ τòν λóγoν) on the ground that it is more fitting to take it in this sense
than in that now established. For example, ‘stout-souled’ (εὔψυχoν) can be used to mean
not ‘courageous’ (τòν ἀνδρειˆoν), which is its established meaning, but it can be applied
to a man whose soul is in a good condition (τòν ε ˆὐ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχoντα)… (Topics 112a
32–36)
Cicero, in the Topica, re-proposes the use of deﬁnition for enabling
speakers to choose starting points that serve them best in the defence
of their standpoints, while ruling out peripheral aspects of a notion. In
the legal context of the Topica (Reinhardt 2003), although Cicero
shares the Aristotelian ideal of deﬁning things by citing genera and
diﬀerentiae (Topica 28–29), deﬁnitional power is given either to formu-
las granted by the law or, again, to etymologies proposed by famous
jurisconsults. Here, I quote two examples where, in the ﬁrst, a formula
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is used to demonstrate that ‘the science of civil law is useful’ and, in
the second, the jurisconsults Servious and Scevola discuss on the
meaning of postliminium (resumption of rights). It must be noted that
in the ﬁrst example, in particular, Cicero puts emphasis precisely on
the clarifying function of deﬁnition, what in modern terms would be
called its dialectical input:
But when a definition is applied to the entire subject under discussion, then that which is
at issue and as it were wrapped up is unfolded (quasi involutum evolvitur id de quo
quaeritur). The standard phrasing of this pattern of argument is as follows: the civil law
is equity put in place for the beneﬁt of those who are (citizens) of the same state (Ius ci-
vile est aequitas constituta iis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas obtinendas), for the
purpose of securing the possession of what is theirs. But the knowledge of this equity is
useful. Therefore, the science of civil law is useful. (Topica 9)2
In the following argument, two etymologies of postliminium are
introduced, and then Cicero shows how an argument in support of a
particular case may be derived by using the second etymology:
In discussion many arguments are elicited from the word through (analysis of the) denota-
tion, e.g. when… the meaning of postliminium itself is the issue… In this word our
friend Servius, it appears, believes that nothing is to be explained etymologically except
post, and wants liminium to be a mere extension of the word… But Scaevola… believes
that the word is a compound, so that it contains both post and limen… On this reading,
whatever things we lost control over when they passed over to the enemy and left, as it
were, their own threshold, seem to return by postliminium when they later return to the
same threshold. With this type of argument the case of Mancinus3, too, can be defended,
i.e. that he returned by postliminium, and that he had not been surrendered because he
had not been accepted; for neither surrender nor donation could be conceived of (as com-
pleted) without acceptance. (Topica 36)
In conclusion, a glimpse into the classical echoes of dissociation
gives historical strength to van Rees’ approach. In the above passages,
deﬁnition serves to delineate particular interpretations of terms against
the background of others that would be less to the liking of the speak-
er. In the ancient texts, the rhetorical aspects of this procedure seem to
be predominant. The use of deﬁnition is mainly explored as a way to
win over the opponent. Yet, what Cicero says at Topica 9 – when
stressing that deﬁnition unfolds what is wrapped up – codiﬁes the
importance of the procedure from the perspective of conducting argu-
mentation within dialectical reasonableness. van Rees has magniﬁed
and systematized a similar double nature in dissociation when theoris-
ing the possibilities that dissociation oﬀers speakers “to maneuver
strategically between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical eﬀective-
ness”. I can only look forward to her next contributions on the sub-
ject, suggesting to also consider the function of dissociation in
favouring critical discussion when potentially fallacious moves such as,
for example, the ad hominem argument, are on stage.4
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NOTES
1 Text after Brunschwig (1967) and translation by Foster (1960).
2 Text after and translation by Reinhardt (2003).
3 Manciunus was consul in 137. He was accused of having surrendered in the war with the
people of Numantia and, consequently, it was argued that postliminium did not apply to
him (Reinhardt 2003).
4 I wish to thank Professor Jeroen Bons for the useful discussion on aspects of this paper
during the Agnès van Rees Conference (Amsterdam, October 2006).
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